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any policy notion as to the extent to which the civil courts should interfere
with the military.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ILLINOIS DIVORCE ACT
The rising tide of family dissolution has at last attracted the attention of the
Illinois legislature. In the 1947 session, several pieces of new "husband and
wife" legislation were placed on the statute books., Unfortunately, these acts
are at best only a surface medication for a serious and many-faceted social problem. Even more unfortunately, the little assistance they promised to courts now
struggling with crowded dockets and inadequate administrative facilities has
been drastically curtailed by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Hunt
v. Cook County2 holding that the Domestic Relations Act,3 the most important
of the statutes, is unconstitutional.
The Domestic Relations Act would set up, "in judicial circuits of 500,000 or
more," a Divorce Division with masters in chancery to hear complaints for
divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, petitions regarding custody of children, alimony, and child support. The principal purpose of the Act is to provide
reconciliation machinery. For example, one provision allows the court to impound the records for at least thirty days after filing of the complaint in any
action in which the rights of minor children are involved,4 so as to prevent
undesirable publicity during the time in which reconciliation will be attempted
and to protect minor children from embarrassment. Other provisions require
the payment of alimony and support directly to the Divorce Division (unless
the court otherwise'directs),s and allow the court to require reports on the welfare of the children from any person or agency to whom custody is awarded.6
The direct supervision given to the court over the payment of alimony and
support is one of the most important features of the act. Judge Robson of the
Superior Court of Cook County, in a comprehensive analysis of Cook County's
problem with the children of divorced parents, has shown that the inadequacy
of the financial protection they receive is increased by the fact that many support orders are in arrears because the mother has no funds with which to engage
an attorney, and the orders are either abandoned or allowed to accumulate until
1 l. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1947) c. 68, § 34 (limiting recovery in alienation of affections
actions to actual damages and expressly barring recovery of punitive, exemplary, vindictive, or
aggravated damages); ibid., c. 68, § 41 (substantially identical statute on criminal conversation actions); ibid., c. 4o , § 13 (extending in injunction powers of court in divorce actions to
restrain third party's interference with possibility of reconciliation or other amicable adjustment of the suit); ibid.,

c. 40, § 19

(allowing court to modify permanent alimony decree in

proceeding separate and subsequent to divorce action upon obtaining jurisdiction of the person
of defendant unless alimony was expressly waived or denied, or another settlement made);
ibid., c. 37, § ios (new divorce statute).
398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
3 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1947) c. 37, § 1o.
4 Ibid.,

at § 1o5.o.

5Ibid., at § IO5.I5.
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Ibid., at § 1o5.16.
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they are impossible to collect. 7 The payment of support and alimony directly to
the court, however, would bring the first default immediately to the court's
attention and give it power to follow up immediately and on its own motion.
judge Robson makes this comment on the value of the court's power to require
reports on the child's custody: "Conditions existing at the time a custody award
is entered cannot be presumed to continue without alteration in the future. A
subsequent marriage, change of residence or employment, the death or departure of the person in whose care an employed mother has placed the child, or
any other factor which might affect the minor adversely should be brought to
the court's attention and investigation made where warranted, by a proper
agency, so the court can maintain the security of its wards." 8
This act was held unconstitutional in a taxpayer's suit 9 to enjoin its enforcement on the grounds that, since it applied only to Cook County, it was repugnant to Article IV, Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution. It is difficult to
determine the exact objection which the court found. Section 22 lists a number
of specific subjects on which special or local legislation is prohibited, including
legislation "granting divorces," and concludes with the provision that "in all
other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted." The court indicates that the specific prohibition on granting divorces
does not apply to the procedural aspects of divorce actions such as are provided
for in this act. Historically, however, it would be more accurate to say that it does
not apply because that prohibition seems to have reference to individual divorces granted by an act of the legislature."' As to the general provision, it is
worth noting that the principal purpose of this section, as shown in the debates
of the 1870 Constitutional Convention's Legislative Committee which drafted
the article, was to prohibit the granting of individual charters and other privileges to corporations, especially the railroads, because of the danger of corruption. When representatives from Chicago, which was already outdistancing
other areas in population, inquired as to whether these prohibitions would prevent legislation for Cook County's needs, they were assured that such legislation
would be possible by appropriate classification, z
A preferable decision is that of the Tennessee Supreme Court affirming the
constitutionality of an act appointing divorce proctors in counties of that state
having a population of over ioo,ooo, judicial notice being taken of the fact that
it would apply to only two counties in the state. 2 The Tennessee Constitution
7 Address to annual meeting of Illinois Circuit and Superior Court Judges, February 6,1948.

Ibid.
9Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill.
412,76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
1017 Am. Jur. § 23 (1938); 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 64 (I934). In the absence
of express constitutional prohibition, divorces granted by state legislatures are valid.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 19o (1888).
xxz Report of Committee on Legislation, Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1869-1870, 576-87, 591-6o8.
"2Wilson v. Wilson, 134 Tenn. 697, I85 S.W. 718 (i916).
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requires that only general laws be passed,'3 and that divorce laws have a general
and uniform operation throughout the state. 4 The Tennessee court said that
the legislature could pass special legislation where, as here, only governmental
or political agencies were involved and the rights of individuals were not immediately affected. Furthermore, since no change was made in the substantive
grounds for divorce, such procedural regulations as were necessary in the opinion
of the legislature would be constitutional. Since the expressed purpose of the
act was the preservation of the marriage relation, the court said that the judgment of the legislature as to the proper means should be respected.
When the Illinois court says that "the incidents of divorce and separation of
married persons and parents with those attendant social instabilities and possible dependency and delinquency are largely the same throughout the state,"' s
there is need for a Brandeis brief. It is elementary sociology that urbanism raises
all the indexes of social morbidity, among which is family disorganization. 6
Illinois is no exception. In a comparative study of the divorce problem in Cook
County and the rural areas of Illinois, Professor Mowrer points out that, while
in the period from 1887 to 1924 the divorce rate in ten rural counties hardly
doubled, the rate in Chicago almost tripled.'7 More than one-half of all Illinois
divorce decrees in I 94 7 were entered in Cook County.,' The sheer volume makes
special administration for particular subjects of judicial control the appropriate
treatment. In rural and semi-rural areas, the judge is more likely to know
something about the parties, making special investigation less necessary. Urban
living, on the other hand, is characterized by anonymity and mobility. Social
pressure by the community to meet such obligations as support is weaker. It is
easier to move out from under them, so that special supervision by the courts is
more necessary. Furthermore, Chicago's problem with regard to the kind of
narrow interpretation which the Hunt case represents is particularly acute. The
population of Cook County is more than half of the total population of Illinois.9
In no state is there a greater difference between the population of the principal
20
metropolitan community and the next most populous area in the state.
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Ibid., at § 4.

Art. II, § 8.

4t

v. Cook County, 398 Ill.
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Mowrer, The Family, Part III (1932); Odum, American Social Problems (i945);
Mumford, The Culture of Cities (1938).
17 Mowrer, Family Disorganization 54 (1939)isOut of 26,o31 decrees entered in Illinois, 14,791 were inCook County, according to figures
compiled by Judge Robson.
ISHunt
16See

x9In the x94o census, Illinois' population was approximately 7,900,000; Cook County's
was 4,000,000. The population of the next largest county was 167,000.

2o The fact that Illinois is peculiarly a one-city state is shown by the figures for Michigan,
the nearest equivalent: total population in 1940, 5,250,ooo; Wayne County, 2,ooo,ooo; next
largest county, 254,oo; and two additional counties, over 200,000.
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Against this factual background, it is regrettable that the court in the Hunt
case concluded that the legislative classification which singles out Cook County
is "unreasonable." It is not consistent with an earlier decision which recognized
that the greater problem of juvenile delinquency and dependency in Cook
County required a special Juvenile Court in that circuit alone.21 Divorce and
delinquency are intimately related; "8o% of the cases appearing before the
Juvenile Court of Cook County and the Boys Court of Chicago can be traced
to divorce-broken homes. ' 22 This same Juvenile Court Act was allowed to give
another and indirect recognition of the relation of population congestion and
delinquency in providing that the salary scale for probation officers would be
23
fixed on the basis of the size of the county.
No doubt, ideally, the state's policy of preventing family dissolution should
be implemented with machinery capable of dealing with each and every case.
On the other hand, legislation which gives some practical assistance where the
problem is greatest cannot fairly be discarded as arbitrary, especially where, as
here, no individual rights are directly concerned and the effect is merely on administrative conveniences.24

ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTIFICATE OF INNOCENCE UNDER
FEDERAL ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS ACT
The plaintiff, counsel for the German-American Bund, and twenty-four others were indicted in 1942 for conspiring to counsel evasion of the draft in violation of the Selective Service and Training Act of 194o. At the trial, evidence
was introduced to indicate that the defendants had promulgated and distributed
National Bund Command Order Number 37 urging members of the organization to register for Selective Service but "to refuse to do military duty" until
repeal of Section 8 (c) of the Act, which declared the "policy of Congress" to be
opposed to filling vacancies in private employment created by induction under
-tLindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328 (1903), sustaining the constitutionality of the Juvenile
Court Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 23, § 192.
- Note 7 supra.
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Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 23, § 195.

Another example of the sterile approach to family relations problems which the Illinois
court has been taking is illustrated by the holdings in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.
2d 464 (1946), that the 1935 act outlawing "heart balm" suits was unconstitutional and the
decision in Johnson v. Luhnan, 33o Ill. App. 598, V' N.E. 2d 8o (x947), that alienation of
affections actions can be brought by minor children. See i5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1948),
noting the Johnson case, supra.
Family relations law in Illinois would be better able to deal with the volume of litigation
now crowding the courts if the Supreme Court were less interested in reading into the Constitution the sociology of a hundred years ago to protect technical and largely useless common
law tort actions and more interested in the practical effects of procedural changes of considerable benefit in the area where volume makes the problem greatest.
24
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